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Recent Developments in the Constitutions of Asian
Marxist-Socialist States
by Professor Chin Kim*
I. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A Communist coup, led by Hafizullah Amin in April, 1979, estab-
lished Afghanistan as the seventh Asian Marxist government.' As a result,
another ideological ally was added to the six existing Asian Communist
governments of: Cambodia, China, Laos, North Korea, Mongolia and
Vietnam. By December, 1979, Amin's Marxist regime was replaced by the
Soviet backed government of Babrak Karmal. 2 Due to both the guerilla
warfare being waged against Karmal's government and the Soviet occupy-
ing force, there is no information available which would indicate that the
Karmal government is currently attempting to draft a constitution for
Afghanistan.
Under the leadership of the Vietnam backed Heng Samrin, the
"Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council Government" formally
proclaimed itself as the new Cambodian Government of January 8, 1979.1
The survivors of the former regime of Pol Pot, who originally had seized
power in 1975, fled to the mountainous back country in order to wage a
guerilla struggle which has continued to this day. The adoption of a new
constitution is unlikely under this protracted civil war.
In Laos, the National Congress of People's Representatives publicly
established the Lao People's Democratic Republic in December, 1975." A
45 member Supreme People's Council, chaired by the President, was sub-
sequently appointed to draft a new constitution.' However, no constitu-
tion has yet appeared.
The latest Mongolian Constitution, enacted in 1960,6 declares that
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.
McHenry, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 80 DEPT. OF STATE BULLETIN B (Jan. 1980).
2"Id.
J.M. van der Kroef, Cambodia: from 'Democratic Kampuchea' to 'People's Republic',
19 ASIAN SURVEY 731 (1979).
' For the English text of the Laos Constitution, see VIII CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUN-
TRIES OF* THE WORLD 1 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz ed. 1976).
For the English text of "Supreme People's Council Appointed," see id.
For the English text of the Mongolian Constitution, see IX CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz ed. 1981).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
the Mongolian People's Republic is a Socialist state. Such declarations
are common to those constitutions of East European countries which
have been enacted since 1960. The style and content of the 1960
Mongolian Constitution follows the pattern established by the U.S.S.R.
and its East European satellite countries.8
The chief basis of the U.S.S.R. Constitution is the principle of social-
ism, incorporated by requiring the nationalization of the means of pro-
duction.' The economy is controlled and planned by the State and all
means of production are owned either by the State or by cooperatives.
The Soviet Constitution further provides for a one-party State.10 The
highest body of state power is in the Supreme Soviety of the U.S.S.R.
whose Presidium, the interim legislative organ, exercises a wide range of
power. The highest executive power is exercised by the Council of
Ministers.1 1
By modeling themselves after the Soviet system, each of these Asian
countries has localized Marxist-Leninist thought through its adoption to
the political, social, and cultural realities within their borders.
The constitutions of Afghanistan, Kampuchia, Laos, and Mongolia,
therefore, shed little light on an analysis of Asian constitutional docu-
ments. For an Asian interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, one must look
to the three remaining Asian Communist countries. This paper will focus
its attention on the Chinese, North Korean, and Vietnamese Constitu-
tions, with emphasis on noteworthy developments since 1970.
II. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
On March 5, 1978, the First Session of the Fifth National People's
Congress of the People's Republic of China (PRC) adopted its most re-
cent Constitution.1 2 It is the third Constitution since the establishment of
the PRC; the first was adopted in 1954,8 and the second in 1975.14 The
7 MONGOLIAN CONSTITUTION art. 1.
' For a discussion of the 1924, the 1940 and the 1960 Constitutions, see G. Ginsburg,
Mongolia's Socialist Constitution, in 34 PACIFIc AFFAIRS 141 (1961).
KONSTITUTSIIA (Constitution) art. 4-7 (U.S.S.R. 1936, amended 1977).
Id. at art. 126.
Id. at art. 30-88.
"2 For the English text of the 1978 Constitution of the People's Republic of China, see
21 PEKING REV. 5 (March 17, 1978). The new Constitution, according to Yeh Chien-Ying,
".. . is a set of general rules for managing the affairs of the state in the new period . . . for
maintaining revolutionary order, safeguarding the interests of the working people and pro-
tecting the socialist economic base and the productive forces... " Yeh Chien-Ying, Report
on the Revision of the Constitution, 21 PEKING REV. 15, 26-27 (March 17, 1978).
'" For the English text of the 1954 Constitution, see 2 CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 261
(A. Peaslee ed. 1966).
" For the English text of the 1975 Constitution, see Kim, The 1975 Constitution of the
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1978 Constitution underwent a few minor revisions in June, 1979.'5 The
amendments cover four points: the creation of standing committees for
local revolutionary committees at and above the county level, the change
of local revolutionary committees at various levels into local people's gov-
ernments, the direct election of deputies to the people's congresses of
counties by the voters, and the change in the relationship between higher
and lower people's procuratorates from that of supervision to one of
leadership.
While the PRC's 1954 Constitution was a more traditional document,
the 1975 Constitution was simple in its style and organization and was
seasoned with a revolutionary flavor. It rectified the Great Leap Forward
Movement based on the General Line of Socialist Construction of 1958
and on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which began in 1966.16
Article 10 of the 1975 Constitution rectifies the Great Leap Forward
Movement in the following words: "The state applies the principle of
grasping revolution, promoting production and other works. .... "
Until the mid-1950's, the pattern of economic and industrial plan-
ning and development in the PRC was based primarily on the Soviet
model. Dwindling Soviet aid and the nation's growing confidence in the
ability of the Communist leadership to fashion a new society propelled
Mao Zedong to initiate the Great Leap Forward Movement, beginning in
1958 and lasting through 1960. The slogan of the campaign was "Twenty
years in a day," with emphasis placed on industry. The institution of ru-
ral People's Communes was a part of the Great Leap Forward Movement.
The Communes reflected the expectation that a more efficient organiza-
tion would release manpower for the projects which were an integral part
of the industrialization program. The Great Leap Forward ended with a
whimper in 1960, during the adverse weather of three bitter years (1959-
1961) which caused widespread famine in many parts of the county.
The 1978 Constitution dramatically revises the preceding Constitu-
tion in many respects, significantly changing the functions and powers of
state organs.17 Specifically, it revives the organs of the legal system,18 and
establishes new citizens rights, particularly emphasizing the rights to
freedom of thought and expression. 9 The new Constitution explicitly res-
urrects such individual rights as election by secret ballot,"0 public trial
People's Republic of China, 1 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 28-35 (1977).
" Peng Zhen, Explanation on Seven Laws, 22 BEIJING REVIEW 8, 10 (1979).
1" Kim, supra note 14, at 1.
" Kim & Kearley, The 1978 Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 2 HAS-
TINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 251, 253 (1979).
"S Id. at 274. See also HSIA & HAUN, THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE PROCURATORIAL SYS-
TEM IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1978).
"2 Kim & Kearley, supra note 17, at 276-8.
10 Kim & Kearley, supra note 17, at 269-70.
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and defense in court.21 The definition of China's current historical stage is
also changed. Most importantly, the overall objective of making China
into a powerful, modern Socialist country by the end of this century is
explicitly described.2
2
Both the 1975 and the 1978 Constitutions defined the PRC as "a So-
cialist State of the dictatorship of the.proletariat. '2 ' The 1978 Constitu-
tion establishes "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought" as the State's
guiding ideology.
2 4
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought is an adaptation of Marx-
ism and Leninism. It is the creative application of the ideological legacy
of Marxism-Leninism as applied to Chinese reality, and serves as a pri-
mary source of Chinese national ideology. Marxist concepts, first dissemi-
nated among Chinese Communist Party leaders in partial, unsystematic
form during the May Fourth era of 1919, were elaborated, modified, and
codified as an association of intellectuals grew into a mass political move-
ment. The teachings of Mao Zedong have played a key role in this ideo-
logical growth. Localization of Marxism-Leninism, as advocated by Mao
Zedong, appears in such doctrines as loyalty to Mao Zedong, universal
application of Mao's teachings, self-reliance, the primacy of human will
over materialism, love of manual labor and devotion to the Communist
Party.25
The expression of Chinese Socialist innovation in constitutional doc-
uments and its proposed approaches for coping with the basic problems
of Chinese Socialist society have a distinctive local flavor. The Constitu-
tion lists the right to strike, in addition to other basic rights of citizens.2
It establishes a "democratic consultation" process for the election of dep-
uties of the National People's Congress, 27 and it advances mass-line polit-
ical philosophy.28 Proper characterization of Chinese Socialist constitu-
tionalism requires that five elements receive special treatment.
The first element is the theory of continuous revolution. This theory
had previously been accorded major significance in the Chinese Commu-
nist Party's conception of a theoretical framework, but had never been
embodied in the national Constitution. The theory was incorporated in
s Kim & Kearley, supra note 17, at 273.
22 Kim & Kearley, supra note 17, at 253.
23 HSIEN FA (Constitution) art. 1. (China, amended 1978).
2' HSIEN FA (Constitution) art. 2 (China).
"' MAO TSE-TUNG, SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, (1961-65). See also, SCHRAM,
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG (1969).
26 HSIEN FA (Constitution) art. 45 (China). For a discussion of the right of strike, See
Kim, supra note 14, at 13, 14.
27 HSIEN FA (Constitution) art. 21 (China).
28 HSIEN FA (Constitution) art. 16 and 41. For a discussion of mass line philosophy, See
Kim, supra note 14 at 11-14.
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the general program of the Communist Party's 1973 Constitutions" and
in the preambles of the 19750 and 1978 Constitutions.3 ' The latter pre-
amble charged the people with the duty to "persevere in continuing the
Revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat."" Mao Zedong, cre-
ator of the theory, advocated that continuous revolution was the proper
method of achieving social change, but that it must occur in wavelike
fashion. This distinctly Chinese theory refutes the type of incremental
linear view of progress inherent in the Soviet system." Mao rejects the
idea that social change can be tightly controlled or directed from above
by the dictates of the State, as the Soviet model advocates. Rather, he
maintains that it is through the interplay of social forces, and through the
development and resolution of contradictions in society, that social pro-
gress comes about.3 4 This line of the Chinese theoretical basis of Commu-
nist revolution is, therefore, quite a constrast to the Soviet position. The
1977 USSR Constitution asserts that "the aims of the dictatorship of the
proletariat having been fulfilled, the Soviet state has become a state of
the whole people."3 The Chinese theory departs from the Soviet theory
by adopting the philosophy that the proletarian dictatorship stage of so-
cialization will be greatly prolonged.
The second element is concerned with the status of the Communist
Party. The 1978 Constitution prescribes that "the Communist Party of
China is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people . . . " and
that "the working class exercises leadership over the state through its
vanguard, the Communist Party of China."3 This provision, originating
in the 1975 Constitution (which stipulated in precise language that "the
National People's Congress is the highest organ of state power under the
leadership of the Communist Party of China . . .",),37 clearly established
the Chinese Communist Party's leadership role over the state organs.
This move merely codified what was already evident in PRC state affairs;
9 For the English text of the 1973 Party Constitution, see 16 PEKING REV. 26 Sept. 7,
1973.
HSIEN FA (Constitution) para. 3, preamble (China 1975, amended 1978).
HSIEN FA (Constitution) pare. 4, preamble (China).
8 Id. See also Kim, supra note 14, at 5-6.
" Young & Woodward, From Contradictions Among the People to Class Struggle: The
Theories of Uninterrupted Revolution and Continuous Revolution, 28 ASIAN SURVEY 912,
915-918 (1978).
Id.; See also, J. STARR, CONTINUING THE REVOLUTION: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
MAO (1979).
,5 KONSTITUTIIA (Constitution) para. 4 (U.S.S.R.). For the English text of the 1977
U.S.S.R. Constitution, see XV CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1 (A. Blau-
stein & G. Flanz ed. 1977).
HSIEN FA (Constitution) art. 2 (China).
76 HSIEN FA (Constitution) art. 16 (China 1975, amended 1978).
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namely, that the party is the ultimate source of all political power."
The political ideas of Mao Zedong, which were shaped by the strug-
gle for power and by his thinking, served different functions at each stage
of the Chinese Communist revolutionary process. In 1975, overriding con-
cern for the party leadership was instrumental in the consolidation of po-
litical power within the party. To combat and prevent revisionism, and in
order to persist in continued revolution under the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat, it was necessary to strengthen the Communist Party's centralized
leadership. Thus, the Constitution clarifies the role of the party in its
preamble, its general principles and the structure of the state, as well as
in those articles pertaining to the fundamental rights and duties of
citizens.3 9
Under the existing Constitution, the National People's Congress ap-
points the Premier, upon the recommendation of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China.40 Control over the armed forces is now
a duty of the party Chairman, placing the armed forces directly under the
party and creating an army of the party."' While the state Constitutions
of some Communist countries include prominent references to the role of
the Communist Party,42 none gives this role the preeminence it receives
under the Chinese Marxist Constitution.
The third element deals with foreign relations. The 1978 preamble
calls for the liberation of Taiwan, although neither a method nor a time-
table is included.4 s As the basis of China's foreign policy, the "Five Prin-
ciples" enumerated are: mutual respect for sovereignty, mutual nonagres-
sion, reciprocal noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual
benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 44 Also indicated is China's commitment
to proletarian internationalism.4 5 A passage such as that proclaiming "an
indestructible friendship with the great Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics and the People's Democracies . . . " in the 1954 Constitution4 6 is no-
where to be found in the 1975 Constitutions. Instead, the new interna-
tional tenet set forth in the 1978 preamble (based on Mao's theory of the
three worlds)4 7 underscores China's need to unite with all countries sub-
38 Since the Communist Party theoretically represents the interest of the people faith-
fully, this is not a change for the framers of the Constitution.
30 HSIEN FA (Constitution) preamble, art. 1-3, 11-13, 16, 26 (China).
40 HsIEN FA (Constitution) art. 22 (China).
4 HSIEN FA (Constitution) art. 19 (China).
42 Kim, supra note 14, at 10.
11 HSIEN FA (Constitution) para. 7 (China).
44 HSIEN FA (Constitution) para. 8 (China).
45 Id.
46 Kim, supra note 14, at 7.
17 For a discussion of this theory, see S.S. KIM, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND
WORLD ORDER 80-81 (1979).
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jected to aggression, subversion, interference and control by the Socialist-
Imperialist superpowers, and to oppose their hegemonism. 48
Cooperation and friendship between the PRC and the Soviet Union
lasted from 1949 to 1955. During this period, the Soviet Union provided
economic aid to the PRC and the two nations collaborated in conducting
their foreign affairs. In 1956, following the suspension of Russian aid pro-
grams, Sino-Soviet discord developed over doctrinal issues which in turn
related to their respective national interests. The genesis of the Sino-Rus-
sian ideological differences emerged in February, 1956 when Kruschchev
announced a de-Stalinization policy without first reaching an understand-
ing with the PRC. To the Chinese Communists, this was revisionism; to
the Russians, the rejection of their view was perceived as dogmatism.
Thus, desirability and inevitability of local revolutionary wars, became an
important issue. The Chinese make a critical distinction between revolu-
tionary and global wars; the former are desirable and inevitable but the
latter can be and should be avoided. Conversely, Soviet leaders have
blurred the distinction between local and world wars by uncritically ac-
cepting and advocating the policy of peaceful coexistence.4 9
The fourth element is the concept of the united front. Both the 1975
and the 1978 Constitutions speak of a "revolutionary united front,"50 as
contrasted to the "democratic united front" language used in the 1954
Constitution."1 "[L]ed by the working class and based on the worker-
peasant alliance . . . " the front is said to unite "the large numbers of
intellectuals and other working people, patriotic democratic parties, patri-
otic personages, our compatriots in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, and
our countrymen residing abroad."5' 2 According to Mao Zedong's thesis of
the "People's Democratic" dictatorship, 3 the united front concept is to
be implemented through the forum known as the Common Program of
the Chinese People's Political Consultive Conference (CPPCC), which
was created in 1949. 5 ' The latest CPPCC Conference was convened in Pe-
king in July, 1979, when the Second Session of the Fifth National Peo-
48 In his report to the National People's Congress in June, 1979, Hua Guofeng said, "
* . . social-imperialism is the main source of tension in the international situation today."
Hua Guofeng, Report on the Work of the Government, reprinted in 22 BEIJING REV. 27, 28
(July 6, 1979).
'9 Dur, CHINA AND THE WORLD: AN ANALYSIS OF COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY
(1966).
50 HSIEN FA (Constitution) para. 5, preamble (China 1975, amended 1978). See also
HSIEN FA (Constitution) para. 6, preamble (China).
" Kim, supra note 14, at 6.
82 HSIEN FA (Constitution) para. 6, preamble (China).
'8 Kim, supra note 14, at 6.
" Kim, supra note 14, at 4.
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pie's Congress met."'
In both Chinese and Soviet systems, as in every Marxist-oriented
system of government, Communist Party formulates national policies.
However, in states that are not yet classless, minor non-Communist Par-
ties are permitted to exist because doctrinally there should be parties to
represent former Nationalist Party members, former businessmen, and
intellectuals.
The CPPCC maintains a democratic facade and exercises leadership
over non-Communist elements. On the surface, the concept of a people's
democratic dictatorship seems to exclude the political activity of certain
classes. However, this is not true, since the application of an ideological
formula seems less relevant to the Chinese Communists than the practical
usefulness of having minor parties."
The last element is the advocation of the principle of Democratic
Centralism. This principle originally appeared in the 1954 Constitution,5 7
and was reaffirmed in the 1975 Constitution." The principle of Demo-
cratic Centralism as a means of coping with the bureaucracy is enunci-
ated not only in the Asian Marxist-Socialist Constitutions," but also in
the 1971 USSR Constitution.6
All state organs, including the National People's Congress and the
Local People's Congress, are to practice democratic centralism." The
Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party also confirms that "the or-
ganizational principle of the party is Democratic Centralism. '6 2 The re-
port on the revision of the 1975 Constitution maintains that: "[W]ithout
ample democracy, it is impossible to have a high degree of centralism,
and without a high degree of centralism, it is impossible to build social-
ism."63 Through ample democracy, a higher degree of centralism is to be
" The CPPCC decided that . . . "the policy of 'long-term coexistence and mutual su-
pervision' between the Communist Party and various democratic parties should be en-
couraged to discuss ... principles and policies of the Communist Party and State affairs."
Deng Xiaoping, Opening Speech at the Second Session of the CPPCC Fifth National Com-
mittee, reprinted in 22 BEIJING REV. 14 (June 22, 1979).
50 For a discussion of this point in relation to the insignificant number of minority
party members in China, see WHITAKER, AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, 289-291 (1972).
57 HSIEN FA (Constitution) art. 2 (China).
5 HSIEN EA (Constitution) art. 3 (China).
5 HON PPOP (Constitution) art. 9 (N. Korea); See also HIEN PHAT (Constitution) art. 6
(Soc. Rep. of Vietnam).
60 KONSTITUTSIIA (Constitution) art. 3 (U.S.S.R.).
61 HSIEN FA (Constitution) art. 3 (China).
62 HSIEN FA (Constitution) art. 5 (China). For the English text of the Constitution of
the Communist Party of China, adopted by the Tenth National Congress of the Communist
Party of China on Aug. 28, 1973, see 16 PEKING REV. 26 (1973).
0 Kim, supra note 14, at 11-12.
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achieved with "efficient and simple administration."6 '
Democratic Centralism is a regulated democracy controlled by cadres
of the Communist Party. Democratic centralism rises from the bottom,
and the representative organs of both party and state are elected by lower
bodies which in turn elect their executive arms at corresponding levels.
The principle is based on the majority rule and obedience to instructions
emenating from above. Ample democracy encourages masses to partici-
pate actively in politics and administration to the fullest.
III. THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
In December, 1972, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) adopted a new constitution" replacing the 1948 Constitution.6
The 1972 Constitution combines notions of socialism and nationalism to
produce a document of fundamental law and propaganda that is unique,
compared to the constitutions of other Marxist-Socialist states.6 7
While bearing a significant resemblance to the fundamental laws of
other Marxist-Socialist states, the 1972 Constitution is unique in the way
that it adapts Socialist constitutionalism to its particular national situa-
tion. In addition to being fundamental law, the North Korean Constitu-
tion propagandizes alleged past 'successes, establishes broad socio-eco-
nomic goals for the future,"s and provides lofty methods of achieving
national goals."
As far as the legal organs are concerned, North Korean courts, under
the existing Constitution, are charged with three broad tasks: first, pro-
viding formal legal support for the existing regime; second, educating or-
ganizations and citizens as to their legal duties and encouraging them to
fulfill these requirements; and third, performing the bureaucratic func-
tions. The procurator's offices also have three basic constitutional func-
tions: first, to supervise the observance of state laws by organizations and
individuals; second, to ensure that "decisions and directives of state or-
gans" do not conflict with the official pronouncements of designated
higher authorities; and third, to protect the current political system, all
state and cooperative property and every individual's constitutional
64 Kim, supra note 14, at 11-12.
" For the English text of the 1972 Constitution of the Korean People's Republic, See
Seymour, The Korean People's Republic, VI CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 1 (Blaustein and Flanz, eds., 1973).
6 The English text of the 1948 Constitution may be found in J.F. TRISTA, CONSTITU-
TIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY-STATES 242 (1968).
67 For an analysis of the 1972 Constitution, see Kim & Kearley, The 1978 Constitution
of North Korea, 11 TEXAS INT. L.J. 113 (1976).
68 HON-PPOP (Constitution) art. 1-72 (N. Korea).
69 HON-PPOP (Constitution) art. 73-106 (N. Korea).
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rights.7"
The first three chapters of the 1972 Constitution, "Politics," "Econ-
omy" and "Culture," form a broad conceptual unit which the 1948 Con-
stitution presented in a single chapter, "Basic Principles."7' An overview
of these chapters will highlight further innovations in the document.
In the first chapter of the 1972 Constitution, entitled "Politics,"
there are at least four elements which have little or no precedent in either
the constitutions of other Socialist countries or North Korea's former
constitution. The first element concerns the issue of an independent na-
tional economy. Although the Constitution reaffirms the Marxist princi-
ple of state dependency on the unity of an entire people, and the princi-
ples of Socialist production relations, it also declares that an independent
national economy is essential.7 2 Although this is a feature not found in
other Socialist constitutions, there is no actual conflict with the ideology
of comparable constitutions because no Marxist-oriented state would
openly discard an independent national economic policy. Instead, empha-
sis on economic self-reliance as a practical ideological guideline seems to
derive from the Juche idea.7
8
The second innovation concerns the Juche idea. As an indication of
North Korea's departure from standard Socialist principles of develop-
ment, its Constitution states that the DPRK "is guided by the Juche idea
of the Worker's Party of Korea, which is a creative application of Marx-
ism-Leninism to our country's reality. 7 4 In international relations, the
Juche idea supports equality with all nations in foreign affairs, yet inde-
pendence in domestic affairs.7 Thus, the application of the Juche idea to
the Sino-Soviet rift is characterized by a neutral stance.
The third element is the declaration of the Chongsan-ri spirit and
the Chongsan-ri method. The Chongsan-ri spirit which promotes the ma-
jority of state affairs, originated in 1959 when Kim I1 Sung visited the
village of Chongsan-ri to speak on the current management of the Social-
ist agriculture, offering guidance toward a Chongsan-ri work method .7
70 HON-PPOP (Constitution) art. 133-146 (N. Korea).
71 HON Ppop (Constitution) ch. 1 (N. Korea 1948, amended 1972).
71 HON PPOP (Constitution) art. 2 (N. Korea).
71 HON PPOP (Constitution) art. 4 (N. Korea). The Juche idea is, ... the principle of
making indigenous need and experience the essential criteria (of North Korean politics), of
implanting self-sufficiency as the central theme of the Korean Revolution (based on Marx-
ism-Leninism) . . . " R. SCALAPINA & C. LEE, 1 COMMUNISM IN KOREA 500 (1972). According
to Kim I1 Sung, the Juche idea would promote the study of the reality of one's own country,
"one's own things in earnest and be vested in them." M. FUKUSHIMA, ON THE SOCIALIST
CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 132-3 (1975).
71 R. SCALAPINA, supra note 73.
76 HON-PPOP (Constitution) art. 16 (N. Korea).
71 FUKUSHIMA, supra note 73, at 140-142.
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The Constitution declares that the "great Chongsan-ri spirit and the
Chongsan-ri method" are to be applied by the state in all its work "to
guarantee that the upper units help the lower, the masses' opinions are
respected and their conscious enthusiasm is roused by giving priority to
political work, work with the people.77
The last element involves the Chollima Movement. The North Ko-
rean Constitution proclaims the Chollima (flying horse) Movement to be
"the general line of socialist construction which . . . accelerates construc-
tion to the maximum .... "78
The Chollima Movement, in line with the building of socialism, is a
government-sponsored production drive, inaugurated in 1959, to ensure
the success of the so-called Five Year Plan. Chollima signifies the
legendary flying horse said to have run one thousand Ni (Korean mea-
surement of distance) in a day. Farmers and industrial workers are ex-
horted to excel like flying horses to the limits of their endurance, and
exemplary individuals and work teams are awarded Chollima titles.
In the second chapter, "Economy," there are two noteworthy fea-
tures. First, the Taean work method is introduced as a basic economic
principle of the nation. 9 According to Kim Il Sung:
The Taean work system is a system of economic management admirably
suited to the nature of a socialist system, for it stipulates that the facto-
ries and enterprises conduct all their management activities under the
collective leadership of Party committees and carry out their economic
tasks by giving precedence to political work, infusing the producing
masses with an enthusiasm for work; that superiors do everything they
can to help their subordinates and that the economy be managed and
operated in a scientific and rational way.80
It augments the Chollima Movement as a productivity incentive and
system of personnel management in the factories. This method was initi-
ated in 1961 when President Kim I1 Sung issued instructions to use it at
the Taean Electrical Appliance Plant. The movement calls for a higher
degree of politicization and for increased communication between man-
agement and workers. It also provides a system of evaluation on which
the work teams are judged. The Taean method is designed to offer a
fairly rational means of overcoming managerial problems in a centralized
control and planning system and to increase morale and the workers'
sense of participation in the management decisions of the plant. At the
77 HON-PPoP (Constitution) art. 12 (N. Korea).
78 HON-PPOP (Constitution) art. 13 (N. Korea); FUKUSHIMA, supra note 73, at 133-135.
The Chollima Movement is a North Korean version of the Chinese Great Leap Forward
Movement.
71 HoN-PPoP (Constitution) art. 30 (N. Korea).
"0 FUKUSHIMA, supra note 73, at 142.
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same time, it also provides a framework for improving technical guidance.
Second, taxation is denounced as a vestige of the old society and
abolished.8' This declaration follows the 1966 decision to abolish the agri-
cultural tax-in-kind by the Supreme People's Assembly. 2 The agricul-
tural tax-in-hand was initiated when the tax rate imposed was almost 25
percent of the harvest. However, this percentage was first reduced and
then abolished in 1966. The 1972 Constitution states that there is to be
no taxation of income. The economic significance of this pronouncement
seems nominal since only a minimal proportion of government revenues
had been derived from direct taxation. Since the State establishes all
prices, wages and the allocation of goods, a much greater indirect tax bur-
den remains. In principle, the Government finances its programs and ser-
vices by collecting and allocating, through various means, the difference
between what state and cooperative enterprises pay for their purchases
and what they receive for their sales.
The Juche idea also permeates the cultural sphere, as reflected in the
Constitution's third chapter. The provision for Juche oriented literature
and art, "national in form and socialist in content... "2 is also consis-
tent with the development of a nationalist socialism, while the provision
that the State should preserve and improve the Korean language is based
on a purer, nationalistic notion.8 4 Neither the former North Korean Con-
stitution nor other Marxist constitutions contains such formulations with
regard to culture.
The 1972 Constitution creates structural changes in the state system
which set the document apart from both its predecessor and other Marx-
ist constitutions. The constitutional government's structural provisions
call for unitary, centralized state power coordinated by a small central
core of decision-makers to insure quick and uniform policy responses.
Even the legal system reflects this desire for firm control at the central
level.85 One of the major innovations of the 1972 Constitution has been
the creation of the Office of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.8s
The President, who is elected for a four-year term, is charged with guid-
ing the interests of the Republic. He not only fulfills the traditional exec-
utive function of supporting and promoting the laws and ordinances cre-
ated by other governmental bodies, such as the policy-making organ of
the Central People's Committee, but he may also exercise greater inde-
HON-PPOP (Constitution) art. 33 (N. Korea).
82 Seymour, supra note 65, at 11.
8' HON-PPoP (Constitution) art. 45 (N. Korea).
HON-PPOP (Constitution) art. 46 (N. Korea).
8 HON-PPOP (Constitution) arts. 133-146 (N. Korea).
" HON-PPOP (Constitution) arts. 63-83 (N. Korea).
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pendence by issuing orders of his own creation. "
Selected by the Supreme People's Assembly for a four-year term, the
President is the head of state and represents the state power of the Re-
public.88 Thus, the constitutional separation of the head of state and the
head of government found in North Korea's original Constitution," and
in most Socialist Constitutions,"0 was eliminated. Indicative of this
change in roles, the 1972 Constitution directs that the President has re-
sponsibility for the leadership of the Administrative Council, the admin-
istrative and executive organ of power. 1 In addition, the President is re-
quired to function as General Secretary for the Worker's Party of Korea
(Communist Party)"s and head the National Defense Commission." Fur-
thermore, the President exercises the authority to ratify and abrogate
treaties, the executive right to receive foreign envoys and the executive
right to pardon.9 Therefore, the President of the DPRK has more than
the symbolic function exercised by leaders of other Socialist countries. He
possesses strong political powers and responsibilities resembling a West-
ern style president, rather than a Soviet head of state.
IV. THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
During the first few months after the collapse of the Republic of Vi-
etnam on April 30, 1975, separate Communist governments were main-
tained in the northern and southern parts of Vietnam. By mid-November
of 1975, the decision was made to unify the country. The election of the
National Assembly was held in April, 1976; the Assembly convened the
following June. The Assembly ratified the unification of the country,
renamed it the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), and appointed a
committee to draft a new constitution."
Work on the first draft of the proposed constitution began early in
1978. On February 2, 1978, the Political Bureau, the Central Committee
of the Vietnamese Communist Party, issued a directive to organize de-
bates on the draft Constitution among the cadres and the people."0 Ac-
57 HoN-PPOP (Constitution) arts. 91, 100-106 (N. Korea).
8 HoN-PPoP (Constitution) arts. 63-83 (N. Korea).
89 HoN-PPoP (Constitution) arts. 47-51 (N. Korea 1948, amended 1972).
'4 KONSTITUTSIIA (Constitution) arts. 121-124 (U.S.S.R.).
"1 HON-PPOP (Constitution) arts. 92, 107-114 (N. Korea).
" Y. Kim, The 1922 Socialist Constitution of the Korean Democratic People's Repub-
lic, 3 REV. OF SOCIALIsT L. 281, 87-88 (1977).
83 HON-PPOP (Constitution) art. 93 (N. Korea).
94 HoN-PPoP (Constitution) arts. 94-97 (N. Korea).
11 As to a chronology leading to this event since the fall of the Republic of Vietnam, see
generally Viet-Nam: Introductory Survey [1979] EUROPA Y.B.: A WORLD SURVEY 1742-3.
'" For the English text of the VCP Directive on the Draft Constitution Debates, see, 4
FBIS DAILY REPORT: ASIA & PACIFIC K5-7 (Feb. 10, 1978).
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cording to this directive, the original timetable was to indicate the pro-
gression of steps necessary for the adoption of a new constitution by the
middle of 1978. 97 However, the invasion of Cambodia and the war with
the PRC delayed the original schedule.
On August 15, 1979, the second draft Constitution was made public
for the nationwide debate. More than a year later, on December 18, 1980,
the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam adopted the
Constitution in its final form.98
From the perspective of Vietnamese constitutional history, the new
constitution is the third such document since the creation of the People's
Republic. The first Constitution was adopted in 19469 and the second in
1359. 0 An analysis of the Constitution reveals that it promotes the spirit
of the two previous Constitutions. The circumstances leading to the revi-
sion of the 1959 Constitution were explained in the preamble of the new
Constitution. The notable purpose would seem to be the attainment of a
unified Vietnam. The Constitution delineates the Socialist revolutionary
tasks and objectives set forth at the Fourth Communist Party Congress in
1976. The major revisions of the 1959 Constitution have been made along
ideological lines to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletarian state, to
develop the working people's right to collective mastery and to insure
success in carrying out the three revolutions: the revolution in production
relations, the scientific-technological revolution, and the ideological and
cultural revolution. Also emphasized in the preamble is the development
of the new system, the new economy, the new culture and the new type of
Socialist man.101 The preamble also promotes the theme that the creative
application of Marxism-Leninism by the Communist Party1 02 has pat-
terned a correct path for the leaders of the Vietnamese.
The Constitution's preamble records both a summary of the revolu-
tionary achievements and the basic law determinative of the successful
growth of Socialism.'0 " An interesting passage from the preamble portrays
the Vietnamese struggle against "the Chinese hegemonist aggressors and
'7 Id., at K6; See also 4 FBIS DAILY REPORT: ASIA & PACIFIC Kl1-14 (May 5, 1978).
For the English text of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Viet-Nam, see
D. Blaustein, Socialist Republic of Viet-Nam, 15 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 1 (Blaustein & Flanz, eds., 1981).
" For a discussion of the 1946 Constitution, see B. FALL, THE VIET-MINH REGIME: Gov-
ERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM (1956).
100 Style and content of the 1959 Constitution resemble those of the 1954 Constitution
of the PRC. For the English text of the 1954 Constitution, see Viet-nam Democratic Repub-
lic, 2 CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS, 1197 (Peaslee ed., 1966). For a discussion of the 1959 Con-
stitution, see B. Fall, Constitution Writing in a Communist State: The New Constitution of
North Viet-Nam, 6 HOWARD L. J. 57 (1960).
101 HIEN PHAT (Constitution) para. 17, preamble (Viet-Nam).
"02 HIEN PHAT (Constitution) para. 11, preamble (Viet-Nam).
"01 See, supra note 98, at 1.
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their henchmen in Kampuchea."' 4 This phrase did not appear in the first
draft. It reflects the evolution which took place in the two years since the
first and second drafts were issued. The preamble also depicts a triangu-
lar relationship between the Vietnam Communist as a leader, the people
as master and the State as the administrator in Vietnamese society.105
The preamble "specifies the relationships between the party's leader-
ship, the people's mastery and state management in Vietnamese society,"
and insures the successful Socialist construction and defense of the So-
cialist fatherland.0 6 This relationship was not clearly stated in the 1959
Constitution. Its preamble used the following words:
Under the clearsighted leadership of the Vietnam Workers' Party, the
Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and President Ho
Chi Minh, our entire people, broadly united within the National United
Front, will surely win glorious success in the building of socialism in
North Vietnam and the struggle for national unification.'0 7
In this close relationship, the purpose of the Vietnam Communist Party
(New name for the Vietnam Worker's Party) is to lead the revolutionary
works and programs related to Socialist renovation and construction. At
the same time the working people of Vietnam, through state initiatives,
are to become collective masters under the leadership of the working
class; and, the State is to manage the society, economy and the life of the
people. Leadership by the Party, mastery by the people and management
by the State would result in a unified whole fulfilling proletarian dictates
and ensuring successful Socialist construction.
The Constitution consists of 147 articles divided into 12 chapters. It
deals with numerous subjects, including: political and economic sys-
tems; 1 culture, education, defense and basic rights and duties of citi-
zens; 10 9 the National Assembly (legislature);' the Council of State;.'1 the
Council of Ministers (the executive body); 2 People's Councils (the local
organs of state authority) and People's Committees (executive organs of
the People's Councils);"13 courts and People's Organs of Control;" 4 and
the procedure for amending the Constitution."'
104 HIEN PHAT (Constitution) para. 10, preamble (Viet-Nam).
'06 HIEN PHAT (Constitution) para. 17, preamble (Viet-Nam).
106 HIEN PHAT (Constitution) para. 18, preamble (Viet-Nam).
107 HIEN PHAT (Constitution) preamble (Viet-Nam 1959, amended 1980).
108 HIEN PHAT (Constitution) arts. 1-36 (Viet-Nam).
109 HIEN PHAT (Constitution) arts. 38-81 (Viet-Nam).
"o HIEN PHAT (Constitution) arts. 82-97 (Viet-Nam).
... HIEN PHAT (Constitution) arts. 98-103 (Viet-Nam).
... HIEN PHAT (Constitution) arts. 104-112 (Viet-Nam).
" HIEN PHAT (Constitution) arts. 113-126 (Viet-Nam).
... HIEN PHAT (Constitution) arts. 127-141 (Viet-Nam).
HIEN PHAT (Constitution) arts. 146-147 (Viet-Nam).
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The Constitution contains a number of features that require exten-
sive analysis. However, this article is specifically concerned with three ele-
ments which illustrate Vietnamese constitutional innovation.
The first element concerns the concept of "collective mastery of soci-
ety."" 6 The expressions "collective master" and "collective mastery" are
used frequently throughout the text of the Constitution.1 7 The original
concept of the collective master as the laboring class was advocated by Le
Duan, a leading Vietnamese theoretician.
The concept of collective mastery dictates that "The State insures
the continuous perfection and consolidation of the working people's col-
lective mastery in the political, economic, cultural and social fields; collec-
tive mastery in the whole country, and in each unit; collective mastery
over society, over nature, and over oneself." ' As an example, the collec-
tive mastery of those who labor in the political field is to be achieved
through the adoption of mass organization as a method by which to con-
duct state affairs.
According to the Constitution, the Vietnam Fatherland Front, the
Vietnam Confereration of Trade Union, the Vietnam Collective Peasants'
Union, the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union and the Vietnam Wo-
men's Union have the right to introduce legislative bills before the Na-
tional Assembly.1 '9 It would seem that the concept of a collective mastery
of the working people has matured in the process of overcoming the bu-
reaucracy and insufficiency of economic management. The constitutional
provision for the active participation of mass organizations in governmen-
tal decision-making illustrates the Socialist Vietnamese approach to the
idea of popular sovereignty. Indicative of this approach is the Vietnam
Confederation of Trade Unions which is constitutionally empowered to
undertake the task of drafting legislative bills and to engage in decision-
making at the highest administrative organ of the State.2 0 Generally
speaking, the trade unions in Vietnam have directed their activities to-
ward resolving difficulties in production and management, consolidating
and intensifying labor discipline, guaranteeing adequate working and liv-
ing conditions to the workers and heightening the workers' cultural and
technical standards. These union activities promote the workers' role as
masters of their own enterprises and of Socialist collective mastery, both
of which are integral parts of a proletarian dictatorship. Regard for the
, HIEN PHAT (Constitution) para. 4, preamble (Viet-Nam).
117 HIEN PHAT (Constitution) para. 4, preamble, arts. 2,3,9,23,37,39,54,127 (Viet-Nam).
118 HIEN PHAT (Constitution) art. 3 (Viet-Nam).
HIEN PHAT (Constitution) art. 86 (Viet-Nam). Article 113, the 1977 U.S.S.R. Consti-
tution, grants public organizations operating throughout the union to have the right to in-
troduce legislative bills.
120 HIEN PHAT (Constitution) art. 86 (Viet-Nam).
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union position is evident from the provision that the President of the
Vietnam Confederation of Trade Unions has a right to attend the meet-
ings of the Council of Ministers.' 2'
The second element deals with the concept of Socialist legality. This
concept mandates that "The State manages society according to law, and
constantly strengthens the Socialistic legal system."'2 2 Socialist legality
can be traced to the Third National Congress of the Vietnam Workers'
Party (Communist Party) held in September, 1960. That convention
stressed the need to achieve Socialist legality through the State, its orga-
nizations and its people.12 2
The last element creates the Council of State."2 This proposal indi-
cates the most significant change in state organs under the Constitution.
The Constitution asserts that "The Council of State is the highest contin-
uously functioning body of the National Assembly, and is the collective
presidency of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam." '25 By taking over the
functions of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly"26 and the
duties of the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam provided
for by the 1959 Constitution,1 27 the Council has become a powerful organ
and its chairman the head of state. 2
8
V. CONCLUSION
The focus of this article has been on the recent developments in Chi-
nese, North Korean and Vietnamese constitutional writing since 1970.
Specific attention has been given to illustrating how each State creatively
localizes the ideology of Marxism-Leninism to cope with its own national
problems.
As an outgrowth of the 1978 Constitution, the currently dominant
national ideology of the PRC is Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought.
This ideology, as evidenced by the adoption of Marxism-Leninism, varies
from that found in the Soviet Union.
In North Korea, the Juche idea has become the national ideology, as
elucidated in the 1972 Constitution. This idea, which may be interpreted
as a "Koreanization" of Marxism-Leninism, has been realized through the
implementation of such devices as the Chollima Movement, the Chong-
san-ri work method and the Taean work system.
121 HIEN PHAT (Constitution) art. 106 (Viet-Nam).
122 HEIN PHAT (Constitution) art. 12 (Viet-Nam).
'3 Id.
See, HIEN PHAT supra note 111.
125 HIEN PHAT (Constitution) art. 95 (Viet-Nam).
HIEN PHAT (Constitution) arts. 51-55 (Viet-Nam 1959, amended 1980).
"v. HIEN PHAT (Constitution) arts. 61-70 (Viet-Nam).
128 See, HIEN PHAT supra note 111.
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In Vietnam, the concept of the collective mastery of the working peo-
ple has been expressed in the 1980 adoption of that country's Constitu-
tion. This concept, a Vietnamese version of the popular sovereignty no-
tion, advocates an active role for the masses so that they may become
masters of themselves, as well as achieving mastery of society, mastery of
nature, mastery over the whole country, mastery over each locality, and
mastery over political, economic, cultural and social fields.
Each of these Constitutions, and the surrounding contexts in which
they were passed, are significant as official expressions of state policy.
However, to ascertain the extent to which the constitutional documents
examined are a social foundation or only a superstructure is an evaluation
best left until after a period of practical use, rather than engaging in the-
oretical speculation.
